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1 Semantics and the Semantic Description of Emotive Expressions 
 
In theory, the semantic description of language should take into account the four-
fold relationship between reality, signs, language and culture. More particularly, the 
job of semantic models is to explain the relationship between (1) extension, (2) 
intension, (3) motivation, and (4) expression. For any semantic domain, meaning 
works because there is an extensional interface between language and reality; an 
intensionalist relationship between denotative signs and concepts that produce 
denotation and sense, not just reference; a motivational basis, i.e. a cognitive-
experiential grounding for creating signs and sense; and an expressive basis, that is, 
a formal-functional system serving as formal signs for the concepts. 
In this paper I intend to borrow ideas from two semantic approaches, namely 
procedural semantics and cognitive linguistics to describe semantically so-called 
emotion expressions. The semantic approach which Miller and Johnson-Laird 
introduced in their monumental work Language and Perception (1976) is interesting 
because it is an attempt to map semantic-conceptual structures directly onto reality. 
Theirs is a thoroughly naturalistic semantics, with a strong extensional orientation: 
language is intended “to pick out” the world (cf. Abbot, 1997). However, we know, 
from the work of cognitive linguists, that this “picking out” is not entirely unmediated. 
Rather, the way language represents reality is mediated by the way the mind works. 
This includes what G. Fauconnier's calls 'backstage cognition', plus other types of 
general and special cognitive processes such as those studied by Langacker (1991): 
construal, perspective, saliency, elaboration, framing, and cohering. Another important 
function of the mind is to create mental models (cf. Johnson-Laird, 1981; Johnson-
Laird and Oatley, 1989) as well as analogical, projective, idealized cognitive models to 
make sense of experience (Kövecses, 1990). Again, cognitive anthropologists remind 
us that these mental or cognitive models may go through a filter, namely the cultural 
models of language and thought in a given linguo-culture (Holland and Quinn, 1987; 
Shweder, 1993; Martín Morillas y Pérez Rull, 1998). 
As regards emotion expressions, it is useful to distinguish two main types. On the 
one hand, some emotive expressions are straightforwardly ‘extensionalist’, that is, 
they can be represented linguistically by models that “read out” the semantic 
representation directly from the naturalistic experience, with minimal “projective 
elaboration” or “amplification” --just the necessary to do the work of interfacing 
language and cognition, for example, by filtering, highlighting or emphasising the 
salience of one aspect of the emotion episode at the expense of another. For 
instance, extensionalist expressions would be: "I was frightened / He looked scared / 
She was shaking with fear...." and the like, all of which convey in various different 
ways intensional concepts of FEAR. 
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On the other hand, some models of emotive expressions rely on analogical, 
projective cognitive models (e.g. metaphoric and metonymic models), which may be 
conventionally entrenched, or be the unconventional result of idiosyncratic meaning-
construction strategies. For instance, analogical-projective instance might be: "I was 
filled with terror / He was seized by unspeakable terror / She was white with fright...", 
and the like, which convey the experience of FEAR by means of experiential gestalts 
of CONTAINER, FORCE, and other analogical models. 
It can be argued that in representing semantically emotive expressions we need 
both an extensionalist-intensionalist type of semantic representation format for the 




2 Extensionalist Representations 
 
In keeping with the above, for the extensionalist description of emotive 
expressions, we may start with a naturalistic model of motions. Here we rely on the 
account that psycho-biologists have to offer on the nature and function of emotion 
experience. Following Buck’s (1986) well-known psycho-biological model, we can 
describe the emotive experience as follows. Emotions are causal natural events: the 
impact of a particular external stimulus produces an affective internal stimulus, which 
is filtered by the relevant prime arousal system and the person’s previous experiences 
with the stimulus. This affective stimulus is registered at two levels, a physiological 
level and a cognitive level. Physiologically, the registering is accompanied with the 
onset of homeostatic mechanisms (Emotion I) which, in turn, trigger spontaneous 
expressive tendencies (Emotion II), as well as a subjective awareness (Emotion III). All 
three types of registering are intertwined by a complex feedback mechanism linking 
bodily manifestations, hormonal, endocrinal, etc mechanisms, and subjective 
experience. Now on the cognitive level, and in order to cope with this stimulus, the 
individual appraises or labels this complex feedback on the basis of past experience, 
of the import of the present situation, of more or less unconscious motives, etc. Once 
this interpretation has taken place, the individual can make a goal-directed response. 
This response may follow some learned display rules or expressive tendencies (for 
example, about what kind of response is appropriate in a given situation). The 
following diagram sketches this psycho-biological model of emotions: 
 
Stimulus Sensation   Subjective     Bodily  Behavioural 
  Register  Register     Expression Expression 
 
  Physiological 
  Register 
 
EXTERNAL INTERNAL EMOTIVE    BODILY  BEHAVIOURAL 
CAUSE  REGISTER EXPERIENCE  RESPONSE  RESPONSE 
 
The causal relationships between these elements can be quite complex. In theory, 
any event external to the self-experiencer, or any event within the self-experiencer 
(eg. thoughts, sensations), is liable to cause an emotive event: for instance, a visual 
or an auditory experience (seeing something, hearing something), a cognitive 
experience (a thought or a stream of thoughts about something), even another 
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emotion (emotions may cause chains of emotions, a phenomenon called ‘affective 
amplification’). Again, the response to en emotive event may be quite complex, 
depending on a number of factors. Some responses may be just a bodily amplification 
of the bodily effect (like crying from sorrow, or jumping with laughter), other responses 
may include acting on the dispositional potential of the emotion (like doing something 
for/against/to oneself or someone else), or else acting out the emotion by following 
display rules, which are usually mediated by learned cultural scripts (these of course 
may be flouted or elaborated upon). Likewise, evidently, not all emotive events are of 
the same quality and tenor (qualia, in the jargon of psychologists), their differences 
depending on the interplay between perceptual, emotive, cognitive and cultural 
factors. According to most researchers, emotions can be classified roughly into: (1) 
sensations; (2) feelings, (3) affects and moods, depending on differences in degree of 
awareness, expressive tendencies, cognitive involvement and cultural shaping. For 
instance, being startled by a loud thump is not the same as becoming angry, 
embarrassed or homesick. 
In sum, emotions are to be understood as complex internal events causally 
connected (distally or proximally) to perceptions, sensations, cognition, dispositions 
and individual and socio-cultural behaviour. These causal relationships may feed back 
on themselves. A visual experience may lead to a feeling, the feeling to a thought, the 
thought to a mood, the mood to a behaviour, the behaviour to more feelings, 
thoughts, actions, moods, etc. and so on. A behavioural response to an emotive event 
(e.g. running out of fear) may cause one to feel embarrassment, the embarrassment 
to feelings of self-rejection, the self-rejection to social avoidance, the social avoidance 
to depression, and so on. (And from there to the shrink.) 
 
 
3 A Semantic Model for Representing Emotion Experience 
 
An interesting question arises: How does this psycho-biological system relate to 
language? There may be perhaps modular (cf. Jackendoff, 1997) connections 
between this emotive system and the linguistic system and other modular systems in 
the mind. Under this view, minimally, we can envision the operation of language at 
two interface levels: at the cognitive label and at the expressive level. Following the 
modular model, with language as a module of its own, language may be used as an 
expressive amplification system to convey the emotion (emotional language). In this 
case, language would be part of the ‘readout’ expressive system (together with non-
verbal communications, gestures, behavioural dispositions, social display rules, etc). 
Given that we have (a) emotive experiences (involving body, mind, culture: social 
behaviour, social norms and rules), and (b) linguistic experiences for emotions, the 
question we aim to pursue is, How do the latter serve the function of representing, i.e., 
“reading out”, the former? 
Our aim here is precisely to propose a model of how emotive expressions are 
“assembled” and deployed for reading out the emotive experience in question. 
It can be argued that the first semantic link between emotive experience and verbal 
representation develops naturally, that is ontogenetically. Repeated episodes of 
emotional experience may cause children to internalise what will be referred to as an 
inductive-deductive propositional schema, containing a series of percept-concepts 
standing for the core elements of the naturalistic emotive experience. These percept-
concepts can be semantically represented as follows: 
 
S = Cause-stimulus (proximal, remote, internal, external) 
W = Self-Experiencer  
X = Affective Episode (E-I: Emotion / E-II: Feeling / E-III: Mood) 
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Y = Bodily Manifestation 
Z = Behavioural Expression 
 
To illustrate this, consider the expression:  
 
(1) At the sight of the man, she ran away trembling with fear 
 
Underlying this expression is the following propositional schema: 
 
 S W X Y Z 
 
The sight of the man she (feel) fear tremble run away 
 
A semantic model of extensional emotive events must explain and describe the 
move from the underlying level of representation encoded in the emotive propositional 
schema all the way to the emotive expression itself. We have argued above that there 
may be two ways in which this is achieved: 
a) an extensionalist “read-out” move: here denotative concepts used for 
denoting the elements of the emotive emerge event directly from the percepts-
concepts (eg. “I was pale with fear”) 
b) an analogical-projective move: here metaphoric and metonymic 
concepts and cognitive-cultural models grounded on experiential or cultural gestalts 
are used for encapsulating the elements of the emotive event (e.g. “She went 
white”) 
 
The extensionalist move consists in representing the elements in the propositional 
schema by means of extensionalist denotative concepts that pick out experiential 
percepts. The construction of an emotion expression is achieved by deploying 
percept-concepts mediated by cognitive processes (Langacker, 1991) in charge of 






That is, a given emotive event may be construed in propositional schemas by 
displaying a different types of perspective, filtering, and saliency. For example, in 
reporting a fear episode, the speaker may highlight the subjective experience of fear 
only (1), without “reading out” from the event the cause of the fear (2), or the bodily 
manifestation occurring with the fear (3), or any behavioural response that the fear 
may have caused (4): 
 
(1) I grew scared 
(2) I was scared of the noise 
(3) I was shaking with fear at the thought of him coming 
(4) I hid under the bed, scared… 
 …… 
 
In moving from propositional schema to expression, we can use several levels of 
semantic representation. To do so, we will adopt a standard pragma-psycholinguistic 
model distinguishing three stages: 
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1. The Conception stage: to convey a message, first, 
propositional templates and schemas are called out from memory; 
2. The Formulation stage: next, abstract syntactic structures 
(depending on universal and language-particular rules of the language in question) 
are called out to encapsulate the propositional concepts; 
3. The Expression stage: finally, surface structures are 
deployed to convey the concepts in accordance with universal and language-
particular pragmatic rules of message and utterance formation. 
 
In accordance with this model, we can posit the following representation formats: 
 
A) At the Conception stage: 
1. A propositional schema  reads out the psycho-biological experience and 
construes, filters, and highlights the percepts of the emotive event. 
B) At the Formulation stage: 
2. A predicative schema represents the construed propositional schema by 
encapsulating the highlighted elements in a pre-syntactic semantic format with 
denotational percept-concepts. 
C) In the Expression stage: 
3. An expression structure represents the predicative schema by expressing it in 
a well-formed syntactic-pragmatic construction. 
 
To illustrate again, given an emotive episode, such as, for instance, reporting the 
experience of a woman´s fear and shock cause by witnessing a car accident, we 
might proceed a follows: 
 
A) Representing the full-fledged propositional schema: 
S = a visual experience (eg. seeing a car accident) 
W = the self-experiencer (woman witness) 
X=  feeling fear  
Y = shock 
Z = a behavioural response as a result of the emotion (e.g. leaving the scene…) 
 
B) Representing the predicative format for this schema: 
[P-emot (<feel>) {(x1 i : <witness: woman>) Experiencer (x2: <fear> <shock>) 
Emotion/Bodily Manifestation 
[(P-visual experience (x1: j:) (x2: <seeing an accident>) Causative Stimulus]] 
Perceptual Process]]] Emotive Process 
 
C) Representing the expressions. Here a number of possibilities exist, depending on 
the topic-focus (pragma-syntactic) packaging of the propositional and predicative 
elements: as:  
- The woman was shocked with fear at the sight of the accident 
- The woman  was trembling with shocking fear at the sight of the accident 
- The woman, frightened at the sight of the accident, began to tremble in shock 




We will next offer a sample typology of emotion expressions showing various ways 
in which cognitive processes might be involved in construing, highlighting and filtering 
elements from the general propositional schema. Likewise, we will show a sample of 
expressive formulas for encoding these schemas. We will first give examples involving 
extensionalist models, and next examples involving analogical-projective models. 
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4 Typologies of Models of Emotion Expressions 
 
I) EXTENSIONALIST MODELS 
 
A) Typologies can be set up for the different ways in which the elements of the 
propositional schema can be construed, filtered, and highlighted. Thus:  
 
1. Ascribing to sb a feeling (E-II) 
“SHE WAS SAD” : (S)‡ W-X-(Y-Z) 
2. Ascribing to sb a sensorial emotion (E-I) 
“SHE FELT DISGUST” : (S)‡ W-X-(Y-Z) 
3. Ascribing to sb a mood (E-III) 
“SHE FELT HOMESICK” :  (S)‡ W-X-(Y-Z) 
4. Ascribing to sb a feeling caused by an external stimulus 
“SHE WAS ANNOYED AT HIS WORDS” : S ‡ W-X-(Y-Z) 
5. Ascribing to sb a bodily effect  
“SHE BLUSHED”: (S)‡ W-(X)‡Y-(Z)  
6. Ascribing to sb a bodily effect, caused by a feeling 
"SHE GREW PALE WITH FEAR”: (S)‡ W-X‡Y-(Z) 
7. Ascribing to sb a behavioural response, caused by a feeling 
“SHE JUMPED WITH JOY”: (S)‡ W-X-(Y)‡ Z 
8. Ascribing to sb a behavioural response, caused by an external stimulus 
“SHE LAUGHED AT THE JOKE”: S‡ W-(X-Y)‡ Z 
9. Ascribing to sb a feeling caused by a cognitive internal event 
THE THOUGHT OF IT SADDENED HER: S‡WS‡X-(Y-Z) 
 
B) An alternative typology can be set up for the different expressive possibilities 
involving a given schema. Thus: 
 
1. Ascribing to an experiencer an emotion caused by an external/internal 
event 
1a. Inessive Models: 
a) Stative predicative ascription with oblique complementation: 
He was annoyed at her words 
He was jealous of their success  
b) Inchoative-lexical change of state ascribed to experiencer: 
She saddened  at the thought of them going away 
c) Inchoative lexico-grammatic predicative ascription with 
resultative subject complement:  
She grew / became sad  
1b. Causative Models 
a) Lexical (synthetic) 
Her words annoyed him 
It saddened her ... 
b) Lexico-gramamtic (prepositional)  
She laughed with joy 
She stepped back in fear 
c) Lexico-grammatical (analytic)  
   It made her sad ... 
   Their success made him jealous 
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II.  ANALOGICAL MODELS: COGNITIVE-CULTURAL MODELS 
 
The ways in which emotive experience can be represented by means of analogical 
and projective models is open-ended. We find here two main types: 
 a) implicitly or explicitly entrenched models 
 b) idiosyncratic models  
 
The first type involves models which are either opaque or transparent, and which 
are conventionalised. For example, the use of the CONTAINER IMAGE SCHEMA, 
She was fearful of him - She was filled with anger.  
The second type involves models which are the result of non-conventional 
personal, idiosyncratic meaning-construction strategies. 
We will offer next some examples of both entrenched and idiosyncratic models. 
 
1) She reined in her anger 
W (SELF) = CONTROLLER; X (ANGER) =  WILD ANIMAL; 
2) He felt all the warmth drain out of him 
W (SELF) = CONTAINER; X-Y = LIQUID; 
3) The thought chilled her 
W (SELF) = OBJECT; X-Y = EXPERIENCE OF COLDNESS = CHILLING 
4) Like a cancer, the anger had metastasized throughout her system until it 
now lived in every tissue 
X = ANALOGICAL MODEL = CANCER GROWTH 
5) She felt her anxiety level rise 
X = UP = INTENSITY 
6) It left him with no target for the monstrous, smoldering mass of rage 
writhing within him, but he got over it, got past it, … the rage had gone 
away 
W (SELF) = UNCONTROLLABLE AGENT; X (ANGER) = INSIDE 
CONTAINER (BODY); FEROCIOUS ANIMAL/MONSTER / = FIRE; 
EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCE = OBJECT IN MOTION (PATH) 
7) He felt the frustration pouring out of him 





We have argued for the need to distinguish two types of semantic models for the 
purpose of describing emotion expressions. On the one hand, we need extensionalist 
models (Miller and Johnson-Laird, 1976; Abbott, 1997) for expressions that “read out” 
semantic emotive percept-concepts directly from experiential reality; and, on the other, 
we need analogical, projective models for expressions that are grounded on, and map 
cognitive-cultural models onto, the percepts that ultimately refer to emotive 
experiences (Kövecses, 1990; Barcelona Sánchez, 1986). Both models serve 
different semantic needs: one takes the direct route, the other the indirect. Both show 
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